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“The image not only makes society, society continually remakes the image.”  
(Boulding 1956, 64) 
 
The aim of this paper is to draw on the insights of two major scholars – Karl Polanyi 
and Herbert A. Simon – to discuss the nature of public policy when procedurally 
rational actors base their learning processes on mutually inconsistent value systems. 
The paper seeks to understand if there is a way out of the apparent pendulum 
between economic constraints to social reform and societal pressures for a humane 
society. 
One of the key issues in Polanyi’s work (1944; 1957a) is the divergence 
between economic and societal values in modern capitalism. This divergence, which 
arises as a result of the peculiarity of the market economy, eventually leads to a 
reaction against the rationale of the market and to what Polanyi refers to as the 
double movement.  
Precisely because the double movement clashes with the autonomy of the 
market, it may disrupt it, and in so doing may lead to dramatic consequences for 
society, as was the case with Fascism and Nazism. It is therefore necessary to discuss 
whether this is the case and how it might be avoided. In this perspective, the section 
that follows provides a synthetic outline of Polanyi’s main tenets and discusses the 
bounds that may preclude a movement toward a more humane economy. The 
distinction between internal consistency (within the market) and external consistency 
(between the economy and society) is introduced to adequately frame Polanyi’s 
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approach in the context of the subsequent theoretical debate on the meaning of 
embeddedness and the role of institutions in the economy. 
The above bounds are apparently those outlined by neoclassical economic 
theory, whereby economic policy – thus action associated to the double movement – 
may improve equity but at a cost, i.e., by reducing allocative efficiency. The key issue 
in this approach is that society cannot interfere with the coordinating function of the 
market, which is based on the information-transmitting mechanism provided by 
relative prices. Based on Simon’s work, I argue that actors do not merely process 
information, they need to interpret it. Interpretation, however, need not be the same 
among different actors. Coordination within the market and in society requires a 
commonly accepted interpretative framework: a broadly intended shared knowledge 
must act as a meta-coordinating instance.  Shared knowledge in modern capitalism, 
however, is strongly influenced by the interests of business. Business acts on the 
interpretative frameworks of other actors through propaganda but above all, through 
the organization of markets and production. The institutions that arise through this 
organizing process eventually feed back on learning processes. 
The general implication of the above discussion is that if members of society 
are to choose what economy they want, policy must focus on how actors learn. Its 
action should aim not only at the material effects of economic and institutional 
change but also at the effects that it produces on learning. In this perspective, policy 
may pursue different types of shared knowledge, depending on which features of the 
status quo policy makers deem open to change. Insofar as it is not marginal change 
that they are pursuing, policy makers must view policy as a co-creator of a change-
oriented knowledge.  
 
Double Movement and Bounded Change 
 
To adequately frame the problem, consider Polanyi’s (1957a, 243) definition of the 
economy in its substantive sense. It is “[t]he interchange with his [man’s] natural and 
social environment, insofar as this results in supplying him with the means of material 
want-satisfaction.” According to Polanyi, the market economy is a specific type of 
economy, based on contracted exchange. Like other economic setups, it must ensure 
the material reproduction of society, its persistence over time. It does so through a 
system of price making markets.1 
The economy is a part of society. The social – as opposed to merely material 
– reproduction of society requires that market values and societal values be consistent. 
Polanyi referred to the external consistency between the economy and society with his 
notion of embeddedness. It is in the nature of the market, however, to move toward 
complete autonomy, whereby it incorporates within its domain (it commodifies) 
features of reality that are irreducible to market values. This is the case with nature, 
human beings and money: unlike actual commodities, neither nature nor human 
beings can be manufactured according to market requirements; the same applies to 
money insofar as its function is the very stability and continuity of markets.  
Complete autonomy of the market would lead to a social catastrophe. This 
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(external) inconsistency eventually determines an opposition to the rationale of the 
market and causes what Polanyi termed the “double movement” whereby the 
movement in favor of an autonomous market is opposed by a counter-movement in 
favor of a self-protecting society. Block (2000/2001, 9) provides a vivid illustration of 
the double movement: “one might say that disembedding the market is similar to 
stretching a giant elastic band. Efforts to bring about greater autonomy of the market 
increase the level of tension. With further stretching, either the band will snap – 
representing social disintegration – or the economy will revert to a more embedded 
position.”   
The double movement, however, conflicts with business – or sections of it – 
and this way affects society’s material and social reproduction. In some instances, it 
may even lead to a catastrophic outcome. Indeed, Fascism according to Polanyi arose 
because the double movement proved to be disruptive (Polanyi 1944, ch. 7). If we 
push Block’s analogy to its extremes, one might suggest that re-embedding the market 
may also lead to a breaking point. Thus, the issue that arises is how to avoid both 
“snaps.”  
A pragmatic approach might be to rely on moderation. The problem here is 
what moderation consists of. For instance, is the commodification of labor acceptable 
provided workers are paid a fair wage? Is fairness a societal or economic value? How 
does a fair wage relate to a market compatible wage? Can the latter be assessed? An 
answer to these questions would be fairly easy if the market was conceived of as the 
coordinating mechanism that conventional economists have in mind. According to 
this view, the internal consistency of the price mechanism is a necessary condition for 
the material reproduction of society. Societal values (e.g., equity) may be pursued but 
this usually involves a loss in efficiency, measured in terms of a trade off. Thus, any 
action is possible but at a cost that the market itself determines. The greater the thrust 
toward non-market societal values, the more likely it is that the economy will be 
unable to ensure the material reproduction of society.  
This is not Polanyi’s view. He argues that the market is not the only type of 
economy available to society: reciprocity – a key feature of modern welfare states – 
and redistribution – a key feature of a variety of activities ranging from household 
activities to charities – may either substitute or complement it. What appear to be 
market constraints need not constitute absolute impediments to the achievement of 
societal goals: alternative economic setups are possible, if the market – and the 
economy it is a part of – is embedded in society rather than the other way round. This 
does not imply, however, that alternative setups can be easily established. 
To appreciate what this involves it is appropriate to focus on what 
embeddedness is and on the confusion surrounding two interpretations of the term. 
This is done in the following section. 
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Embeddedness and Institutions 
 
A range of authors has criticized Polanyi because he neglected the institutional 
features of the market. Hodgson (1999) acknowledges that Polanyi stressed the 
importance of institutions such as the state (126) and moral norms (257). 
Nonetheless, he endorses Barber’s claim that Polanyi’s notion of disembeddedness 
“diverts attention from the basic sociological fact that all types of exchange 
institutions are interdependent with their environing value patterns and other 
institutional subsystems” (Barber 1977, 27; quoted in Hodgson 1999, 95). 
Granovetter (1985; 1993) argues that order in economic life depends on the existence 
of patterns of interpersonal relations that establish trust and avoid opportunism. In 
his view, this is what embeddedness is about.2 According to this approach, the claim 
that a market is disembedded involves an under-socialized view of economic activity, 
just as in neoclassical analysis. Block pushes the argument further by contending that 
Polanyi himself “provides us with some extremely important suggestions about how to 
carry out an analysis of the always embedded market economy, but he does not give us 
that systematic account” (Block 2003, 298; emphasis added).  
The distinction between internal and external consistency may be of some 
use here. As far as the former is concerned, Polanyi provides an outlook of markets 
where he clearly points to the existence of “elements that can be designated as 
functional” (Polanyi 1957a, 267), which include custom and law. He therefore 
acknowledges that markets cannot be reduced to a set of relative prices. Internal 
consistency is not possible without institutions.  
Does this mean that Barber’s statement is wrong? If “diverts attention” is an 
understatement in that Barber actually means that Polanyi neglects institutions, then 
there is reason to believe that Barber misinterprets Polanyi. If, quite to the contrary, 
“diverts attention” were to imply that Polanyi is focusing on something else, then 
Barber is perfectly right. Indeed, Polanyi’s primary concern is not with internal but 
with external consistency, i.e., with the need to “meet our present overconcern with 
economic matters and to achieve a level of human integration, that comprises the 
economy, without being absorbed by it” (Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson 1957, xviii). 
This leads him to focus on those institutional features that allow the unity and 
stability of the economy, which is not the same thing as the unity and stability of the 
market.3  In other words, when Barber states that “all types of exchange institutions 
are interdependent with their environing value patterns and other institutional 
subsystems” Polanyi would probably reply that, although this is true, it does not imply 
that interdependent subsystems are mutually consistent. The key issue for Polanyi is 
not how institutions allow the market to function but how the rationale of the market 
– arguably the profit motive – and the institutions that it leads to clash with a number 
of other institutions that underlie the societal setup. What the whole embeddedness 
issue is about, in Polanyi, is not the existence of institutions; it is about the existence 
of institutional inconsistencies.4  
Some of the confusion over Polanyi may depend on Granovetter’s notion of 
embeddedness,5 which is definitely closer to conventional views of the economy 
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whereby institutions arise only as a solution to the problems that individuals face 
when they interact. The difficulty with his view is “not the isolation of individuals 
which characterises 19th century civilisation, but the functional differentiation of 
society, the disembedding of the economic sphere from the totality of social 
relationships. Modern societies, as opposed to pre-modern societies, are differentiated 
according to their function (and no longer by stratification). The complexity of 
personal relationships does not touch the question of functional differentiation of 
society in any way” (Thomasberger 2001, 6). 
The implications for the conventional policy outlook in terms of the trade 
off between efficiency and equity are rather straightforward. The issue is not to assess 
the compatibility of redistribution or reciprocity with the allocative potential of the 
market but to assess the compatibility of the market with the values of society.6 The 
market cannot provide the criterion for an assessment because it is its functioning and 
its rationale that are the object of the assessment.  
Simon’s theoretical contribution to choice theory and cognitive theory is of 
major importance in understanding how this assessment is possible, thus, how society 
can choose the appropriate combination of redistribution, reciprocity and exchange. 
 
Choice and the Learning Process 
 
In a conventional (neoclassical) setting, a market is supposed to coordinate economic 
activity by collecting and diffusing information on the relative scarcity of resources 
and on individual preferences. Following this approach, undifferentiated actors are 
expected to choose based on the information they gather from the market. They do so 
by maximizing, which requires that they choose in a substantively – in Simon’s (1988) 
sense – rational way. The problem with this approach is that the limited mental 
capability of human beings precludes their ability to choose in such a way, except in 
very special cases (Simon 1972). In general, a different approach to choice is called 
for. Following Simon’s suggestion let us focus on the implications of procedural 
rationality. 
Choice involves the existence of a goal, which – owing to bounded 
rationality – may not be clearly identified at the outset (“I want to buy a car” rather 
than “I want to buy model X of brand Y”). The identification of the goal is strictly 
related to the choice set that is available (What automobile models are available? How 
much can I afford to spend? How long can I keep on searching?). How these issues are 
dealt with – i.e., how the overall problem is framed – involves the use of existing 
knowledge, which provides the lens through which an actor perceives reality. Existing 
knowledge also provides a framework to assess whether a problem may be deemed 
analogous to others that were solved according to a specific procedure: analogies and 
heuristics are generally based on such experience. Previously acquired knowledge 
provides a scaffolding to support further knowledge (Newell, Shaw, and Simon 1958).  
The implication is that since each individual is subject to specific 
experiences, learning is – at least to some extent – an idiosyncratic process.  Thus, 
there is no absolute criterion to process the information that prices provide. Even if 
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contracted exchange were to effectively transmit information throughout the economy 
that same data would be interpreted in different ways and the different 
interpretations would feed back on that very data. Contrary to the claims of 
conventional theory, the market cannot achieve internal consistency on the basis of 
information alone.  
Scholars who are close to the conventional approach suggest that the 
solution to these problems lies in institutions. According to this view, institutions are 
important precisely because they constrain choice and action, thereby providing 
guidelines in a world of uncertainty, and in so doing they complement the market in 
its coordinating function (North 1990). This restrictive view of institutions, however, 
does not solve the issues raised by Simon’s approach. Institutions – in the above 
meaning – need to be understood, i.e., interpreted. A signpost is not enough if it is 
not subject to a common – or mutually compatible – interpretation. Following 
Simon’s contribution to economic thought, knowledge and interpretative frameworks 
– as opposed to information processing – are a key element if we wish to understand 
economic behavior and choice. 
Overall knowledge includes tacit as well as explicit knowledge. Explicit 
knowledge is what we know that we know, and what we know that we do not know 
(Rooney et al. 2003). Tacit knowledge, in turn, is the background knowledge that 
supports explicit knowledge, thus, all those things an actor may be unaware of but 
without which she would be unable to understand reality. By being tacitly accepted, 
this knowledge avoids her effort to continuously reassess what she already (believes 
she) understood. Since it is taken for granted, it is one of those aspects of knowledge 
that is hardly questioned.7 It often includes the beliefs – i.e., explicit or implicit 
assumptions concerning reality – that actors resort to when they must formulate 
decisions but lack the required information or are unable to fit the information they 
have within the knowledge they have.8 
Three implications are worth pointing out. First, in order for a market to 
coordinate economic activity, and to be internally consistent, actors must interpret 
that information and the interpretative frameworks they use must be mutually 
compatible. Since interpretative frameworks arise out of available knowledge, how the 
market functions ultimately depends on society’s shared knowledge.  
The second implication is that the distinction between external and internal 
consistency is not as clear-cut as one might think. External consistency – the 
compatibility between societal values and economic outcomes – and internal 
consistency – the compatibility between the economic choices of all the actors 
involved – both depend on the interpretative frameworks to which individuals resort. 
Ultimately, they depend on overall knowledge, which can hardly be split into two 
independent sections: the economic and the non-economic one. 
The third implication is that society may avoid being disrupted by the double 
movement only if it shares a common view of what its goals are. In terms of both 
economic and societal coordination, what is required is for society’s knowledge to act 
as a meta-coordinating instance.  
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Shared Knowledge as a Meta-Coordinating Device 
 
Given Polanyi’s distinction between economy and society, it is appropriate to 
investigate how shared knowledge arises in the two contexts. Let us first consider 
business behavior, that is, the distinguishing element of a capitalist market. Business 
generally pursues a profit by hiring workers, producing goods and selling them to 
customers. Customers must know the characteristics of the goods. When they do not, 
they need to learn. In some instances, learning is straightforward: in most countries, 
people eat bread, so they search for it, try different types and eventually choose the 
one they prefer. There are instances, however, where people need to be informed 
about the very existence of a good. This typically occurs when a new product is 
introduced in the market. There are still other instances where information is not 
enough. The features of a good may be difficult to appreciate, owing to technical 
complexity or because the potential buyer cannot easily understand how the good is 
supposed to satisfy her needs. Thus, firms may sell their products only if their 
potential customers have both the appropriate information and the interpretative 
framework to appreciate that information. In most cases it is up to the firms to 
provide both, e.g., through advertising. They have everything to gain from doing so. 
Competition among firms allows more information to be circulated. Since 
each firm wishes to show that its good is better than others, potential customers are in 
a better condition to make comparisons. Competition, however, does not always 
allow customers to identify appropriate interpretative frameworks. While a 
pharmaceutical firm will try to prove that the drug it manufactures is better than its 
competitor’s drug, no firm will care to provide information or a cognitive framework 
that takes into account prevention as opposed to cure (unless there is something to 
gain from prevention as well). Public debate over the quality of goods occurs within 
an interpretative framework that is consistent with the profit constraint of the firms 
involved.  
In fact, while drug producers may not be concerned with prevention, other 
firms – e.g., those that deal with environmental issues – may have an interest in 
dealing with it. Thus, as the range of industries potentially involved grows, the 
information that is circulated increases and the interpretative framework becomes 
more comprehensive. This would be the case where the market provides the required 
shared knowledge that coordination requires. In the most favorable of conditions, 
however, the available interpretative framework will be one where only profitable 
opportunities are taken into account. All interpretative frameworks that transcend the 
bounds set by the profit motive will be missing. While single firms may be unable to 
affect the market, business as a whole can organize it according to the profit motive.9 
Knowledge, however, does not depend only on economic choice with its 
related problem-solving activities. The boundaries provided by the profit constraint 
are irrelevant for a great many problem solving activities. Learning may simply consist 
in making sense of something, independently of any direct application to choice. In 
fact, an individual may choose not to define boundaries too strictly or even to change 
them as she goes about learning. This may occur both in strictly scientific research10 as 
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well as in making sense of life and choosing how to conduct it. It is also the case with 
Veblen’s notion of idle learning. 
Extra-economic interpretative frameworks may therefore arise independently 
of learning processes that are associated to economic choice. At the same time, 
however, these extra-economic interpretative frameworks may feed back on economic 
decisions. This is the case when ethical considerations favor market transactions – as 
with honesty – or when they lead to restrictions on economic activity, as with child 
labor or working hours.11  
At this point of the argument, it should be fairly clear that markets may well 
be characterized by institutions of all sorts associated with both economic and extra-
economic requirements and views, but this should not deter attention from the 
distinctive feature of a market economy, i.e., that firms must pursue profit. The 
autonomy of the market (disembeddedness) does not consist in its de-
institutionalization; it consists in the subsumption of societal values and goals – such 
as those mentioned above on child labor – by the profit motive. This potential 
conflict between different perspectives suggests that contrary to Hayek (1949, 80), 
“the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” that a consumer 
has is not all she needs to choose appropriately. She may well want to take into 
account more general features of knowledge. Thus, she may believe that the metric 
that is required to assess economic welfare need not be the same that is required to 
assess social well-being (Sen 1999).12  
It is important to investigate what happens when different – e.g., market and 
non-market – interpretative frameworks clash, thereby leading to a Polanyian counter-
movement. Typical cases are when workers base their claim for a higher share of 
income on ethical principles (e.g., the human right to a decent standard of living), 
thus on extra-market criteria. When such claims clash with business goals, firms have 
to react. They have to deal with a twofold divergence. At the “real” level, they have to 
restore a distribution that meets the profitability requirements of the existing market. 
At the cognitive level, they have to restore the view (the ideology) whereby market 
valuation reflects the priorities of society.  
Under these circumstances, the division of labor within the firm as well as 
among firms may be assigned a “political” task. In the first instance, the organization 
of production may have to be devised in such a way that the other parties do not have 
the bargaining power to claim higher distributive shares. A further step is to avoid 
even the insurgence of a distributional conflict: the parties would have to feel that the 
status quo is either the only or the best achievable one. These two situations are what 
Gramsci (1949) refers to as control and consensus, respectively. Control occurs when 
the parties would want to bring about an alternative but cannot. It has to do with the 
balance of power among the actors. Consensus implies that the actors do not think an 
alternative is possible. This has to do with what they know and how they acquire that 
knowledge. If the division of labor is devised so that workers or client firms do not 
know how economic activities are being carried out, this prevents actors from 
envisaging possible alternatives to the status quo (Marglin 1978; Ramazzotti 2004).  
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These considerations may be extended to what actors deem technically 
possible. Technology13 is generally the outcome, through innovation, of a problem 
solving (i.e., learning) process, which depends on a more or less defined goal (e.g., 
finding a cure for malaria) and on boundaries that circumscribe the problem. Apart 
from available knowledge, a boundary is generally provided by the profit constraint, 
whereby the innovation must eventually ensure a return. From a business perspective, 
only potentially profitable technologies are worth seeking. It is, therefore, reasonable 
to believe that, owing to the prevailing distribution of world income, research in 
goods associated with conspicuous consumption in industrialized countries is going to 
be livelier and more profitable than research that tries to find appropriate drugs for 
tropical diseases.14 Although unexpected innovations are always possible as the 
unintended consequences of economic action, when technological evolution is 
subject to the profit constraint, it entails an overall pattern of innovation – thus 
technological paradigms and trajectories – that reflects privatistic rather than social 
priorities. Technological paradigms and trajectories that reflect business priorities 
eventually favor some institutional setups and mental habits while precluding others.15 
The above discussion of technology – and that of the division of labor – may 
recall the notion of ceremonial encapsulation, i.e., the “encapsulation of technology 
within the ceremonial value structure of the community” (Bush and Tool 2001, 
211).16 There is more to the issue, however. Once a pattern of technological change is 
established, it persists over time independently of the interests that led to its 
insurgence – i.e., it is path dependent. As Freeman points out, “[p]atterns are 
persistent partly because scientists, technologists, designers and others believe they 
will persist and act accordingly. . . . Like any institution they are sustained not by 
‘naturalness’ but by the interests that develop in their continuance and the belief that 
they will continue. This belief is of course not arbitrary but is founded on previous 
knowledge, experimental work and discoveries” (1994, 312). Furthermore, that same 
“previous knowledge” will underlie the analogies and heuristics those researchers 
resort to when they pursue their research. It will feed back on the way that anybody 
looks at that technology: “The situation of today shapes the institutions of tomorrow 
through a selective, coercive process, by acting upon men’s habitual view of things” 
(Veblen 1899, 190; quoted in Hodgson 2004, 186).17 Thus, instrumental valuation 
may ultimately be biased by the internalization of interpretative frameworks that are 
inconsistent with the material reproduction of society.  
Although propaganda (ranging from advertisements to the funding of 
political action committees) plays an important role in the establishment of an 
interpretative framework, it is not its sole determinant. A major feature is the 
organization of markets and production, which affects what people can learn and 
how. The institutionalization of consumption and working patterns determines an 
important part of the world in which actors live. Insofar as these patterns persist over 
time, they tend to be taken for granted. Rather than being potentially subject to 
questioning, they become a part of tacit knowledge: they point to what is “socially” 
possible or appropriate (Zucker 1977).18 From this perspective, they provide the 
conditions for external consistency. A disembedded economy does not merely reflect 
an ideology, it also concurs in its emergence.  
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To sum up, social actors learn in different ways. Their interpretative 
frameworks may allow them to conceive of an economy that is embedded in society 
rather than the other way around. This cognitive counter-movement is likely to 
determine a reaction in terms of a reinforcement of the interpretative frameworks that 
view the market economy as the only opportunity that society has. Propaganda, the 
division of labor and technology in general are major determinants of shared 
knowledge. While propaganda only acts upon the mental habits of actors, technology 
also provides “real” constraints to change. In terms of production processes, workers 
and firms cannot expect to carry out their tasks in a manner that is deemed 
“technically” inappropriate. In terms of output, consumers can only ask for what is 
available; they cannot demand what is deemed “technically” impossible to produce. 
These real constraints eventually feed back on mental habits, thereby preventing 
actors from foreseeing possible alternatives to the commodification of labor – more 
appropriately, the labor force – and nature. Thus, contrary to conventional views, 
technology provides the conditions for, rather than the constraints to, both internal 
and external consistency.  
This double movement in cognition should not be viewed in a mechanistic 
fashion. Learning processes provide new outlooks on reality, so that actual outcomes 
may significantly differ from those envisaged by the parties involved. Furthermore, 
shared knowledge is only a specific, albeit distinctive, feature of culture in modern 
market economies. It is specific because culture includes other elements that result 
from the history of a specific community. It is distinctive insofar as the rationale of 
the market tends to underlie the organization of society.19  
 
Policymaking and Knowledge 
 
Let us now return to the consistency issue. Following Polanyi, I already argued that 
there is a wide range of possible economic arrangements, depending on how 
reciprocity, redistribution and contracted exchange interact. For consistency to occur 
both within the economy and between the economy and society, I contended that 
actors must share a common view of how the economy and society are (and should 
be) arranged, what I referred to as shared knowledge.  
Shared knowledge has to do with the relation between reciprocity, 
redistribution and contracted exchange. It sets the priorities concerning how markets 
and production should be organized and those that should underlie technological 
evolution. It is strongly affected by institutions that relate to existing technology, the 
division of labor, or to consumption patterns. These, in turn, tend to reflect the 
interests of business.  
Institutions that transcend business or even the economy as a whole may also 
affect shared knowledge. Values such as fairness or trust may play an important role 
in a wide range of economic activities but their origin often lies in religion or in other 
dimensions of cultural evolution. Even when they do arise out of economic 
interaction, actors tend to internalize them and to accept them independently of 
whether they are functional to their interest or not. 
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The double movement reflects a breach in shared knowledge. It occurs when 
pressure to change the status quo clashes with vested interests, existing mental habits 
and/or technical constraints associated with existing technological paradigms and 
trajectories. Three cases are worth highlighting. First, at a strictly economic level, this 
breach in shared knowledge may change the business outlook (expectations): new 
claims on how to run the economy may increase uncertainty as to what types of 
conduct should and will prevail and what performance will result. In other words, the 
degree of turbulence of the economy may be expected to rise, all other things being 
equal. This may negatively affect accumulation and growth. The political effects of full 
employment (Kalecki 1943) provide an example. Second, at the societal level, it may 
undermine established views that are believed to be at the roots of existing society. 
Consider, for instance, how restrictions on traffic or smoking may be interpreted as 
detrimental to individual freedom. Third, at the technology level, it may be deemed 
inconsistent with the technical requirements for economic activity. Consider, for 
instance, resistance to anti-nuclear energy policies on the grounds that no viable 
alternative is available. 
Since a breach in shared knowledge questions the status quo, actors cannot 
take the priorities underlying the economic and societal setup for granted. They must 
make choices. Simon’s contribution to choice theory provides important insights in 
this regard. As I already argued, it suggests that choice may occur in different ways, 
depending on how actors frame their choice problems. Tacit knowledge – what actors 
take for granted – plays a crucial role, here. Insofar as a breach in shared knowledge 
forces actors to reassess precisely what they had been taking for granted, it forces them 
to undertake a learning process to figure out how the economy and society can and 
should be organized. A critical issue is how extensive the reassessment of tacit 
knowledge is going to be.  
Actors may accept the economic, institutional and technological contexts as 
general bounds. Alternatively, they may act upon these general features to change 
them. The first approach implies that change only consists in economic and societal 
adaptation to external shocks and to endogenous (spontaneous) evolution. It 
considers the status quo as improvable only at the margin. The second approach 
considers the existing economic and societal setup as only one out of a range of 
possible ones. Between these two extremes lies a range of intermediate approaches, 
which are distinguished in terms of what is deemed exogenous, i.e., not subject to 
purposeful change. 
Far from relying on a demiurgic act of will, the second approach – which we 
might call progressive change – assumes that change throughout all of the above 
contexts is possible but that it does not consist of merely deciding – possibly through 
elections – that a different society must be organized. It acknowledges that a major 
constraint occurs on cognitive grounds. Owing to the features of knowledge and 
learning depicted above, no valuation criterion is available that is based on an 
objective criterion. Rather, valuation criteria are reconstituted as society evolves.20 
Societal evolution is strongly influenced by how mental habits and learning processes 
are affected (directly through propaganda, and indirectly through processes such as 
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the division of labor and technology) by the double movement. Thus, in order to 
envisage an alternative to the status quo, at the individual level actors need to escape 
the restrictions imposed on their knowledge by the mental habits they have acquired. 
They must make sense of what they know in order to make sense of whatever change 
the economy and society (can) undergo.21  
At the collective level, whatever alternative is envisaged must be compatible 
with existing shared knowledge. More appropriately, shared knowledge must co-evolve 
with economic and societal evolution. Awareness that change is possible implies a 
shared interpretative framework, which cannot arise other than through the 
interaction between economic and institutional change on the one hand, and the 
reconstitution of shared knowledge on the other. It involves a societal reassessment of 
the priorities that underlie technology, institutions, and the beliefs to which these 
lead. 
Policymaking is necessary to ensure that internal and external consistency are 
achieved, but these consistencies depend on shared knowledge, thus on the image of a 
different societal setup – including societal goals – that is available or that gradually 
emerges. The scope for progressive policymaking, therefore, is to establish a specific 
knowledge framework, i.e., an interpretative framework of reality whereby the status 
quo is not taken for granted but may be progressively changed. In turn, progressive 
policymaking can enhance actual change only by feeding upon what social actors 
deem necessary as well as possible. 
Progressive policymaking is, in this perspective, a special type of action 
because it needs to focus on the creation of new knowledge as a meta-coordinating 
instance. While it may involve specific technical measures, its general goal is not 
strictly technical; it consists of enhancing people’s awareness that change is actually 
possible. It is this awareness that allows all individuals to carry out a search process to 
identify where and how it is possible to act on the economy and on society. It is the 
same awareness that makes them receptive to whatever change is actually occurring. 
Policy makers and (sections of) the community need to interact if progressive 
change is to come about. However, this may not occur. Policy makers may reflect 
vested interests or the interpretative frameworks that defend those interests. Policy 
may therefore restrict the potential for a different outlook on society. Similarly, the 
extant shared knowledge framework may preclude people from envisaging change. 
There is apparently no way to predict what path society may eventually follow, but the 
very openness of the learning process, its irreducibility to a mere business outlook, 
suggests that societal change need not be bound by the latter. 
 
Final Remarks 
 
Polanyi’s discussion of the double movement is centered on the key feature of a 
market economy whereby labor and nature tend to be reduced to commodities. Issues 
such as the decline of the welfare state, neglect of full employment policies, disregard 
for action that prevents environmental disruption and, more generally, the emphasis 
on market values and on market compatibilities as the appropriate criterion to make 
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economically and socially relevant choices can be explained in terms of this rationale. 
The inconsistencies between the institutions of the market and those of society lead 
to pressures toward a different economy, where redistribution and reciprocity prevent 
market forces from exercising a dominant role on the economy and society. Attempts 
to establish such an economy, however, may have dramatic consequences: Fascism 
and Nazism were one such consequence. 
The paper suggested that a solution to this dilemma cannot rely on the 
conventional notion of a trade-off, nor can it be based on some vague form of 
moderation. The dilemma raises a key theoretical issue, namely how to choose 
between different economic setups. Based on Simon’s analysis of choice and 
cognition, the paper argued that central to the consistency of both the market and of 
society as a whole is the role of knowledge as a meta-coordinating instance. It also 
argued that, in a society where distinct interests characterize  different groups of 
economic actors, learning occurs in different ways, that is to say, it is centered on 
different goals and it reflects different ways to frame a problem. Owing to the central 
role that knowledge plays, it is in the interest of each party to influence learning and 
knowledge to exert control over, or achieve the consensus of, other parties. 
What is at issue is not the distortion of truth but the viewpoint chosen, thus 
the priorities assigned. As far as firms are concerned their priority is profit. Alternative 
priorities may relate to strictly economic issues such as distribution, or to issues that 
are generally not viewed as strictly economic – e.g., gender, the environment, world 
poverty, and peace – but eventually affect the way economic relations are structured in 
that they are associated to the relation between the market, redistribution and 
reciprocity.  
Business acts on knowledge directly, through propaganda, but also indirectly, 
by organizing markets and promoting technologies that comply with its priorities and 
requirements. In so doing, it establishes an institutional context that actors tend to 
internalize and take for granted. Thus, it is true that “[d]isembeddedness is rooted in 
the belief that the economic system operates according to universal, natural laws” 
(Champlin and Knoedler 2004, 894) but this belief is not just the outcome of a social 
thought that eventually prevailed over others. It is the outcome of real – as opposed to 
mere thought – processes.  
Progressive change, i.e., change that is not restricted within the bounds of a 
market economy and its associated business interests, involves the interaction between 
policy makers and (sections of) the community. Policy makers must enhance a general 
outlook of society whereby change of the status quo is possible. They must favor 
attempts to envisage different economic and societal setups. In turn, the measures 
they take, to change the economy and its institutions have to be consistent with the 
overall view of a possible society that emerges out of society itself. Thus, the solution 
to the double movement dilemma lies in a subtle relation between real and cognitive 
change. 
The general conclusion of the above discussion is that formal democracy is 
necessary but definitely not a sufficient requirement for progressive change. A double 
movement in cognition is also required, which considers learning as a manifold 
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process, based on the evolving institutional setup of a society. This paper only 
provides an outline of why this is so. I hope that further research will provide a more 
in-depth understanding of how this can occur. A possible step in this direction may be 
to extend the above inquiry to the multiplicity of collective agents that make up a 
community. This would overcome the implicitly assumed dualism between 
policymakers and society, allowing for the existence of actors – such as unions, 
consumer associations, and gender groups – who are also likely to contribute to the 
evolution of a society’s shared knowledge. 
 
Notes 
 
1. An important characteristic of a market economy is its pervasiveness: “In so far as exchange at a rate 
is in question, the economy is integrated [i.e. it achieves unity and stability] by the factors that fix 
that rate, not by the market mechanism. Even price-making markets are integrative only if they are 
linked up in a system which tends to spread the effect of prices to markets other than those directly 
affected” (Polanyi 1957a, 255).  
2. “The embeddedness argument stresses [. . .] the role of concrete personal relations and structures (or 
‘networks’) of such relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance” (Granovetter 1985, 
490). 
3. “A study of how empirical economies are instituted should start from the way in which the economy 
acquires unity and stability, that is the interdependence and recurrence of its parts. This is achieved 
through a combination of a very few patterns which may be called forms of integration. (. . .) 
Empirically, we find the main patterns to be reciprocity, redistribution and exchange” (Polanyi 
1957a, 250). 
4. K.W. Kapp, whose views were very close to Polanyi’s, provides a clear illustration of one such 
inconsistency between societal and market values: “If instead of 20,000 workers 20,000 heads of 
cattle were exposed to certain death due to an epidemic and recurrent disease, there would be an 
easily calculable incentive to adopt required preventive measures. The fact that the human factor of 
production has no capital value places it in a market economy in a less favorable position than 
machinery or cattle unless strong ‘countervailing’ and political forces interfere with the free 
operation of the competitive process” (Kapp 1963b, 159). Swaney and Evers (1989) highlight the 
similarities between Polanyi and Kapp. 
5. Reference is especially to Granovetter (1985). 
6. Thus, whether redistribution or reciprocity exert a positive or negative effect on market performance 
may be important in its own right but is not central to Polanyi’s main argument. 
7. What I am referring to is what M. Polanyi (1962, 267) denotes “the whole system of acceptances that 
are logically prior to any particular assertion of our own, prior to holding any particular piece of 
knowledge.” Following this perspective, tacit knowledge is not just uncodified information. 
8. Foreigners who are not informed about a country’s customs and habits typically resort to their own 
when they interact with locals. They implicitly assume that what they deem reasonable may be so for 
the locals as well. More precisely, they consciously or unconsciously resort to the analogies and 
heuristics drawn from what they know, and apply them to situations they do not know.  
9. This does not imply that the market is organized in the most profitable way. Such a claim would 
imply a fallacy of composition whereby what is rational from an individual point of view is also 
rational from a collective point of view.  
10. Michael Polanyi (1962) mentions the case of research in Mathematics as one where the goals and the 
boundaries of the problems to be solved change as advances in the discipline occur. 
11. In this perspective, the potential conflict that Sen (1982) points out, between (economic) preferences 
and (ethical) meta-preferences, is possible precisely because different interpretative frameworks co-
exist. 
12. If different metrics exist, it is likely that – contrary to Coase (1988) – social costs, which are 
measured in terms of social well being, cannot be internalized in the price mechanism, which relates 
to economic welfare (Kapp 1963a; 1963b).  
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13. Technology includes, for the above purposes, “tools,” (individual) skills, the division of labor and 
related (firm and industrial) competences, independently of the way they arise and their use. 
14. Cangiani (2003, 337) points out the relation between these considerations and Polanyi’s approach: 
“The starting point in Polanyi’s essay is that in a market economy [. . .] the economic system tends to 
be self-referential. Since the choices and the very selection of information are determined or biased 
by ‘the principle of gain and profit’, ‘economic’ efficiency cannot be immediately and in general 
considered as coinciding with efficiency from the point of view of society.” 
15. These considerations on technology differ somewhat from Polanyi’s general views. Polanyi was 
concerned with technology and how it affected freedom (Polanyi 1955; 1957b; 1957c). His major 
concern was with the strong interdependence that technology determines within society, that is to 
say, how it complexifies society. He pointed out that reliance on the positive effects of technological 
achievements may be accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty (Polanyi 1955), especially when 
control of technology is in the hands of a few people. He did not focus on the determinants of 
technology and on how they could be referred to the business requirements of market actors. 
16. Bush and Tool (2001) consider, along with other possible cases, the situation where “[t]echnological 
innovation runs apace – giving the illusion of fundamental institutional changes – but it occurs 
within a system of ceremonial dominance that is preserved through sophisticated processes by which 
forces within the community attempt to preserve the ideology that justifies existing patterns of power 
and differential advantage” (2001, 214). 
17. Hodgson (2004) refers to this process as “reconstitutive downward causation.”  
18. This is what Scott (1995) refers to as the cognitive pillar of institutions. See also Dequech (2002) on 
what he terms the “deeper cognitive function” of institutions. 
19. The above discussion is consistent with Mayhew (1987) in that it reinstates the central role of culture 
in neoinstitutional economics. It aims to qualify this role by suggesting how a specific feature of 
culture tends to evolve. 
20. Jennings and Waller (1995, 413) argue, “Despite his acknowledgement that engineers showed little 
inclination to coordinate and operate the industrial system along lines less devoted to the pecuniary 
interests they had long served, Veblen thought they could. Here lies the rub: how should the 
efficiency goals Veblen favored be defined, and how should they come to be so defined?”  These 
considerations apply to engineers, policy makers and to single actors as well. 
21. In neoinstitutionalist terms, “Veblen’s dichotomy between invidious distinction and efficacy [. . .] 
becomes an ‘internal’ fulcrum for cultural reinterpretation and social criticism” where ‘internal’ is 
the opposite of an “‘external’ fulcrum, sought in purposeless, nonhuman, mechanical cause and 
effect” (Jennings and Waller 1995, 413). 
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